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9a Until 1957 Mary Jone~ had enjoyed sound health, · but on June 2nd of that year she (j
went to the hospital su'tfering from abdominal pains. On June 13th, she underwent an ./
operation and her su~geon removed a mass growth from her intestines, and Mrs. Jones
was so informed. Though Mrs. Jones' actual trouble was cancer, that fact was not told
to her or to her daughter, Alice Brown. The doctor fully realized the seriousness of
his patient's illness, but hoped to cure her so .that she might reswne a normal life.
After the operation, Mrs. Jones improved, and on July 1,1957 she was able to leave
the hospital and return to her home. A week or so later she resumed her normal life
and was reasonably active for a woman of 53 years of age. She performed all of her
usual house work, such as washing, cooking and attending to her flowers,etc.
In June, 1958, S.R.Smith, an insurance agent, went to Mrs.Alice Brown and talked
with her about a life insurance policy on her mother, Mrs.Jones. Mrs.Brown informed
the agent about the operation upon her mother for the removal of a growth from her
intestines. The insurance agent asked Mrs.Brown if her mother's health was good, and
Mrs. Brown told the agent, 11As far as I know, Mother feels a lot better than I do."
The agent took out an application for insurance and asked Mrs.Brown nwnerous questions, which she answered truthfully. After the application was filled out the agent
asked Mrs .Brown to sign it for her mother, which she did. Mrs. Brown signed her ·
mother's name thereto without reading any of the answers that had been written by
the agent. The company issued the policy payable to the estate of Mrs.Jones. The
agent made no attempt to interview Mrs. Jones, and she was never informed that the
application had been made or that a $1,000 policy was issued. It later turned out
that as to a material question, an answer had been written that Mrs.Brown did not
give. The question asked was if insur~d had ever suffered from cancer. The answer
"No" was there written by the agent. In March, 1959, Mrs.Jones became ill and went
back to the hospital. She became increasingly worse and died of cancer in April,l959.
Upon Mrs. Jones' death, her Executor demanded payment of the thousand dollars claimed
to be due under the policy, but the Company denied liability on the policy on the
ground that false representations ~ nd answers material to the risk had been made in
the application and hence, the contract of insurance was void. Mrs. Brown comes to
you and states the above facts, and asks you whether the Company is liable under the
policy. How would you advise?
, ~ ~q
(INSURANC~) One of these answers should be glven:(l)The Company would be liable.The
wrong was that of the Company's agent. Mrs.Brown could assume that if she gave correc·
answers such answers had been put down. So .held in 194 Va.966.The statement that her
mother was in good health means only that as far as she knows she is in good health,
or (2)Under V#38.1-330 it is necessary that the individual insured apply for .the
policy, has knowledge thereof or consents thereto at the time of the making of the
contract except in the cases of group insurance, insurance between husband and wife,
and insurance on the life of a minor. Since this statute is one stating Virginia's
public policy it cannot be avoided by waiver or estoppel. Hence the Company would
not be liable •

D 5 c;
1· Dgring 1954 while happily married, Ruth Rhodes was issued a policy of insurance
by Sure-Pay Life Insurance Co. insuring the life of her husband Caleb Rhodes. The
policy provided for the payment of $10,000 to Ruth on the death of Caleb. Thereaftel
Ruth and Caleb became estranged and in February of 1959 the two were divorced. The
divorce decree provided for an absolute divorce and extinguished the rights of each
in the property of the other. In October of 19.59 Caleb died and Ruth, who at all
times had paid the premiums with her own private funds, tendered the policy to
Sure-Pay Life Insurance Co. and demanded that it pay her $10,000, The Company deniec
that it owed Ruth the $10,000, asserting ·that she had no insurable interest in the
life of Caleb. The Company did, however, tender to her a refund of the $1,482 she
had previously paid as premiums on the policy. Ruth now asks you whether she may
recover from Sure-Pay Life Insurance Co. the full of $10 1 000, or whether she should
accept the premium refund.
What should you advise her?
{INSURANCE) I would advise her that she was entitle to the whole $10,000. In life
insurance an insurable interest is required only at the inception of the policy,
so the policy is valid. The fact that she herself had paid all the premiums gives
her a still stronger case. Her contract with the insurance company was her propertY.
and not her husband's, so the divorce decree extinguishing the rights of each in
the property of the other had no effect on her rights in the policy •

.5:TB:~aved Spook filed a Motion for Judgment in the Circuit court of Rappahannock
County against Granite Life Insurance Co, to recover tJte benefits of a life insurance
policy issued by that company to her husband, Spector Spook. At the trial of the
case the following facts were proved:
That Weasel, the local insur&~ce agent for Granite Life Insurance Co., sold a· life
insurance policy to Spector Spook which named plaintiff as beneficiary; that all
premiums on said policy had been promptly paid; that before the policy was issued
Weasel explained to Spector that he would have to file a written appHcation for the
policy; that the application was filled out by Weas el ; that Spector informed Weasel
that he had been treated for arteriosclerosis and that he had previously been denied
life insurance by three other companies; that Weasel wrote the a nswers to the
questions on the application blank and falsely stated that Spector had never suffered
from arteriosclerosis, and that he had never been turned dmm for insurance by any
other company; that Spector signed the application >-rithout reading it; that a policy
was i ssued to Spector, to which a .copy of the applicat.ion was attached, and that
Spector placed the policy in his lock box; and that. Spector never read the policy
or application prior to his death. After plaintiff c..nnounced t hat she rested her
case, defendant moved to strike the evidence. How shoul d the C:)ur t rule on the
motion?
(INSURANCE) The motion should be denied. The question states that the facts set forth
therein were proved. Hence deceased acted in good faith . He could assume that correct
answers were put down by the agent as long as he had no r eason to suspect the contrary. If the insurance company has been defrauded i ·t. was by an act of its own agent,
and the loss should fall on it ra.ther than on the i nnoc ent insur€d and his beneficiary. See 194 Va.966 on p.2118 of Insm·a:nce Cases tn thes e notes.
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6J>t£iss was indebted to Vickers in the sum of $5 1 000 as a result of a business
transaction between them. When Bliss was unable to pay this debt, Vickers cancelled
the obligation out of generosity and his regard for Bliss. Min~ful of Vickers' kind•
ness to him, Bliss purchased a policy of life insurance on his own life, in the
face amount of $5 1 000, and named Vickers as beneficiary. He reserved the right to
change the beneficiary, at any time. Shortly thereafter, Bliss felt another economic
crisis coming, and he borrowed $1,000 from Bank and assigned the life insurance
policy as collateral security. Vickers joined in the assignment.
TTf,lon Bliss' death without having paid B~, the insurance company paid Bank $1,000
1
demand on the administrator of Bliss• estate for pa,_ent to him of $1,000 f'rom the
estate, but this demand waa 11kewiae refused.
Vickers seeks your advice and asks you (a)whether he has sufficient legal inte~es~
in the policy to entitle him to recover any of its proceeds, and(b)if so, is he entitled to recover $1,000 from the estate of Bliss. How would you advise him with
·;, respect to questions (a) and (b)?
.
. . (INSURANCE) (a) Yes, Vickers has sufficient legal interest in the policy i;.o ~ollect
· $4,000. The assigment was· to secure a debt or $1,000. Vickers still remained ben~fir
ciary subject only to the assigment. The law permits anyone who is sui juris to
make anyone he wishes the beneficiary. The insured has an insurable interest in his
own life. Since Bliss could have made the insurance payable to his estate and then
willed it to Bickers there is no reason why he cannot de directly what he could 0.o
indirectly. If Bliss has that much confidence in Vicker's integrity, the chances o!.
Vickers killing Bliss to get the insurame are negligible.(b) Yes. Bliss was primarily liable for the $1,000 and Vickers• interest in the policy was security theref'or
-a suretyship in re. On suretyship principles Vickers would be subrogated to Bank's
rights against Bliss• estate. See 184 Va.259 on p.2107 of the Insurance Cases in
these notes.
a resident of Roanoke,Ve.• , effected an automobile liabi~ity poli<;Y in
5•J' tlbtorist
iver insurance co. Whi le driving on a trip to Norfolk, he was :Lnvolved ~n a
Safe~.
"th a car driven by Claimant, who received :Jerious injuries. Motor:Lst was
coll:LS:LOn Wl
~j~.
not hurt. The State Trooper investigating the accident told Motorist that the
·e vidence showed conclusively that the accident resulted solely from the
negligence of Claimant, who was given a traffic summons and forfeited his appearance
bond. Motorist was so sure that he would hear nothing further from Claimant, and
t hat the collision was due solely to Claimant's negligence, that he did not report
the occurrence to his insurance company until he was sued by Claimant almost two
years after the accident. As soon as suit papers were served on Motorist, he sent
t hem to the Insurance Company and then learned for the first time that his policy
cont ained this provision:
"When an accident occurs, written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the
insured to the Company as soon as practicable.n
Insurance Company asks your opinion on the above facts as to its liability for the
defense of the action and .the pa~ent of any adverse judgment that might be rendered.
How ought you to advise it?
(INSURANCE) I would advise that it was not liable. The provision for notice is ao
important that it goes to the essence of the insurance contract and is an implied
condition to liability even when not made an express condition. See 189 Va.913 in
the Insurance Cases in these Notes and 199 Va.221 in accord therewith •
phy~ical

7. ~~ienry Hopewell worked as an employee of the Fair Furniture Company in Lawrenceville, Virginia. In 1959~ during his employment there, Henry became covered by a
group insurance policy vlhich proviC.ed for termina·~-ion of coverage upon termination
of employment, but gave the employee the rigbt to convert the policy to an individual one within 30 days af ter termination of his employment.
Henry's emplo;yment at Fair Furniture Company was t enninated on January 30, 1960.
Under the terms of the above policy, he applied for and obtained an i ndividual
pol icy, the sta·\Jed effective date of -vrLl ch Nas February 1, 1960, naming his w·ife
as beneficiary. On January 20, 1)61 l:e coJTunttted suicide. The new policy limited
the Company's lia.bili t y to return of p:cemiun1 i f suicide occurred within one year
from its effective date.
Hopewell's wife has sued fo r t he full anon~1t of t he policy, contending that the
new policy was but a continuation o1 the groUl) i nsurar1ce , and therefore the suicide
clause did not apply.
How ought the court to r-ule?
(INSURANCE) The court :::hould rule t hat tl-,. e dause do os apply. The inc i vidual policy is a nevl contract made at a different time and for a different prem.i.1.un. The
sui cide clause is a usual provision in suc.h policies. 199 Va. 273 on p. 2121 of
the Insurance cases in these notes.

7D~1e r.iding as a guest passenger in an automobile owned and operated by his
brcther-in-law Maverick, Mangle was ser·iously injured when the car struck a telephone
pole. Maverick reported the accident to Black Hawk Insurance Co., his liability
carxier, and informed the adjuster that the accident was entirely his fault. The
company suspected that rviaverick was not telling the truth about how the accident
occurred, although it had no proof that he was falsifying at that time. The insurance policy contained the customary requirement that the insured cooperate with the
company in the defense of any action brought against him, and the policy contained
the further provision that no action should lie against the company unless the insured had fully complied with all of the terms of the policy. Mangle sued Maverick to
recover damages for his injuries, and Maverick promptly forwarded the motion for
judgment to his insurance company. The insurance company advised Maverick that it
would defend him in the ~ction brought by Mangle, but reserved the right to deny
liability for the payment of any judgment if it could be later shown that Maverick
had failed to cooperate with the company as required by the policy. At the trial of
the case Maverick testified that while driving his car at a speed over 70 miles per
hour he reached into the back seat to get a bottle of beer and that this caused him
to strike the pole. A judgment was rendered against Maverick for the sum of $15,000
in favor of Mangle.
Shortly after the judgment became final, the insurance co1npany for the first time
learned that Maverick had withheld from it ti1e names of three witnesses who would
have testified unequivocally that they saw the accident, and that Maverick was
driving at a speed of 35 miles per hour, and that Maverick was forced off of the
road by Banjo who suddenly stepped in front of Maverick's vehicle, causing him to
swerve from the road. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour. In a later action by
Mangle against Black Hawk Ins1,1rance Company to recover the amount of the judgment,
the company denied liability claiming that Maveriek had violated the provj_sion of
the policy requiring him to cooperate with the company in the defense of the action
brought against him.
Who ohould prevail?
(INSURANCE) Insurance Company should prevail. There has been a flagrant violation
..>f the co-operation provision justifying the company in rescinding its contract with
Maverick. 1nsurance Company has avoid ed a wc:.iver by exprensly reserving its rights.
Mangle can have no grea-ter rights against the Company tha.n Maverick has for if
Maverick's policy can be avoided, i"'::.~> avoidance destroys any derivative righse
Hangl e would otherwise have .. See 199 Va . 908 on p.2122 of the Insun:nco Cases in
t hese Notes.
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7•1~Jss purchased and paid the premium for an automobile liability insurance policy

•

from Insurance Company. One of the provisions of the policy was as follows:
nThe Insured shall cooperat.e with the company and, upon the company's
request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting
settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of
witnesses and in the conduc.\i of suits."
While driving his automobil·e , Moss collided with a n automobile owned and operated by Prim. Prim instituted an action against Moss for damages, alleging that Moss
had negligently caused him injuriAs. Insurance Company defended the action under a
reservation of its rights. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for Prim
in the amount of $1 1 000. When Insurance Company failed to pay the judgment to Prim,
and after execution against Mot":s was ret;urned "no effects", Prim instituted an
action against Insurance Company alleging that he was entitled to recover his judgment against Moss by virtue of Moss• liability policy. At the trial of this action,
Insurance Company's adjusters testified that they had .first learned of the accident
from Prj.m two days after it occurred~ that Prim had supplied the names of all
witnesses, that Moss declined to come to the Company'~ office to advise it how the
accident occur:tred, and that it ~~as not until the morning of the trial of Prim v.
Moss that Moss gave the Company his version of how the accident occurred.
At the conclusion o.f all the evidence Insurance Company, over the objection of
Prim, requested the court to instruct the jury as follows:
"If you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that Moss failed to
cooperate with Insurance Company, even though you may also believe from the
evidence that such failure to cooperate did not prejudice the company, then
your verdict sh?uld be for Insurance Company."
Should the court so instruct the jury?
(INSURANCE) Yes. Cooperation on material matters is contractual and a.
. _ ~ condition. Hence it is immaterial whether the Company was prejudiced. The Company is also
privileged to defend under a timely reservation of rights without waiving any of
its own rights. Creditors of the insured can have no greater rights than the insured •
Note that this was not a policy of insurance issued to satisfy the provisions of
the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act in which case the provisions of that
act would apply. See 189 Va.913.
6. Father and Son jointly owned an automobile. A policy of liability insurance was
effected on this automobile, which stated that Father was the sole and unconditional
owner. There was a provision in the policy which provided that if the ownership of
the automobile was not sole and unconditional, the insurance should not apply. Son
loaned the automobile to Friend, who was involved in an accident, in which third
persons were injured. The Insurance Company consults you and tells you that if it
had known that Son was a joint owner with Father, it would have issued a pclicy and
named both of them as insureds, and a~ks you whether the fact that the ownership
was not sole and unconditional affects the Company's liability. How ought you advise·
(INSUFANCE) It does not. If the misrepresentation is not material to the risk when
a·ssumed it will not avoid the policy. Here the Company admits it was immaterial. To
allow avoidance on that ground would also violate the spirit of the statute requiring each automobile liability insurance policy to contain the omnibus clause
which insures anyone driving the car with insured's permission. See 202 Va.579 on
p.2126 of the Insurance Cases in these Notes •

•

6~~~in

pur~h~sed

Kerns, a business executive of Culpeper, Va.,
in 1955 a $10,000
policy of life insurance on his life and designed his estate as beneficiary. All
premiums were, through the life of the policy, paid by him. Reserving the right to
change the benef:i.ciary, he subsequently named his girl friend, Ruby Burton, the
beneficiary under the poli~y. In 1961, Kerns borrowed from Farmers Bank the sum of
$3,000 and assigned the policy, with o tlBr <.;olla-t;,eral, to secure the payment of the
note executed to evidence t~w debt. Insurance Company was notified of the assignment. In 1963, upon the dea-lih of Jolm Kerns, the Ir.,surance Company, at the bank's
request, paid ~~3 .~~ooo to .Farmers Bahk on the debt and delive:ced to Ruby Burton a
check for the balance of ~~7 ,000 , William Kerns, Adrdnistrator of the E3tate of John
Kerns, instituted an action against Huby Bu:c·ton, claiming that she had no insurable
interest in the life of John Kerns and should pay over to his estate the $'7 ,ooo.
Ruby counterclaimed, setting forth that not only -vras she entitled to the $7,000,
but that the estate owed her the ~$3-~'000 deducted from the poli(;y and paid on the
note to Farmers Bank. Issue vras joined on these ttoJ'O claims. How ought the Court
decide?
(INSUfiANCE) The Court should deeide in f avor of Huby Burton on both matters. Every
person has an insurable interest in his ot.vn life, and; if sui j uris, may make anyone
the beneficiaryc Since John Kerns only pledged the policy as security he did not
intend to divest; Ruby Burton of her rights. Hence shs: ia subrogated to the bank's
rights against Kern's estate. Had Kerns redQemed the policy, as he intended, he
would hmre had $3JIOOO less in his estate and ~p3,000 more in life insurance for the
benefit of Ruby Burton. See 184 Va.259c

·-

r

9.5 J5-ot bti.ng Thomas was issued a $10~000 life insurance policy by Southern Bell I,ife
Insurance Company~ In his application he truthfully warranted that he was a professional actor and that he was not engaged in the employ of a railway company or an
airplane co~panJ'• The policy provided that the company insured the life of Thomas
so long as he was engaged solely in the business of a professional actor. The
policy also provided~
.
nThis policy shall be incontestable for any cause after J..t shall have been
in force during the life of the insured for two yaars from ~ts date~"
After the policy had been in effect for three years Thomas was k1lled whlle.he was
employed as a brakeman by a railwny company. Tho~1as was employed by the ra1lw~y.
company without the knowlf:ldge and consent of the 1nsurance c ompany. The benef~CJ.ary
in the policy sued tho irlst::. ran~e com.p<:~. n;y to r ecover the fqce amount, of the pol1cy
and the com~any defended, d 8nyi ng liability.on the ~round that Thomas was employed
as a brakeman by a railway company at.t~'2l tlme ~f h.ls_,_ death, and had been so employed
for six months previously. Th.e bene.f .1c1ary ins1sted uhat the company could not deny
liability in view of ths inconter;J::,able claus e .
Is the beneficiary entitled to recover?
. ,
.
,
.
~INSU HANCE) No. The incontestable clause has ·~o do W.1.tn ~he J.nsurer s nght to avo 4__d
voidable contract of insurance. It has no-tih1ng to co lnth the ~overage which re:ains the same throughout the life of the policy., Se e 1.59 Va "832 and 170 Vao479.
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8 ~~l11y Jenkins had acted as an a gent of Premier Fire Insur::mce Co. for many yea!'3 a
On June 15,1964 he approached the President of Ri chmond Tobacco Corporation urging
that there be obtained from p-.cemi er Fi~ e I nsurance Company a policy insuring the
corporation's tobacco -v;arehoust:s a gainst loss by fi:c e. 'l'he President, who had been
authorized t;o do so by the Board of Directors, signed on beha l f of the corporation
an application for such fire ins urance in the f ac e amount o.f ~p200,000. A policy
for that amount was promptly i ssued to the corpora t i on by Premier Fire Insurance Co.
in exchange for the initial premium of ~~500 paid by the corporation. In August of
1964, a large tobac co warehouse of R~. ehmond Tobac co Corpora t i on was destroyed by
fire, and the corporation ma de demand upon Premier Fire I nsurance Co. to compensate
it for the lo s s. Premier Fir e Insuranc e Coo refused to do so. Shortly thereafter
Riclli~o nd Tobacco Corporation brought a n a ~tion on t he po li~y a gainst Premier Fire
Insurance Company in the Law and Equi t y Court . of t he City of Richmond, asking
recovery of $140,000 as its loss.
On the trial of the case., Premier Fir e Insurance Co. proYed that for many years
i t had f ollowed a fixecl rule advis ing its agents tha t it v:ould not insure against
loss by fire any building whi~h hc:> d be r-m damag ed by ar.othe:r fire within twelve
months prior to t h e time of t he makin g of a pplication for fire insurance; that
thi s rule was well known t o Billy Jenkins; t h a.t the des troyed vrarehous e ha d been
damaged by fire on January 10 , 1 964 , and a gain on Hay l lth i n the same ye ar; that
t he application f or insuranca which had bC
'JE. n s i gned by Ri :::hmond Tobacco Corporation,
after t he question 11 Have t hese premises b een dama ged by fire wi·thin the past
twelve months?" bore the answer 11 No 1r; t hat the mi s representation was material to
the risk of Premier Fire I nsurance Co . ; t hat it woul d not have issued the policy to
Richmond Tobacco Corpora·i;.ion had the t r ue fa(~ ts been stated; and that it had tendered back to Richmond Totacco Corpo~a. ti o n the $500 pr emium pa id. Richmond
Tobacco Corporation proved that its Pre sid \?nt, at the time the application was
solicited, told Jenkin3 uf the two ~rior fires; that J eru{ins informed the President
that such prior losses •-re:re not materia l; that J enkins had the President sign on
behalf of Ricl:unond Tobacco Corp.Ji:atio n a blank form of a pplicati on; that all
answers to the quest i ons on the f orm were filled in by Jenkins after he left the
President's office; and that Richmond Tobacco Corporation a t no time prior to the
fire loss was advised of the answers pl aced on the applicat ion form by Jenkins.
The jury returned a verdj_ct fo:;:· Ric hmond Tobacco Corpor ati on for $134,000. Premier
Fi re Insurance Company then moved the court to set aside the verdict as contrary ·r..o
t he law of the ca se.
Should this motion have been sustai ned?
vq./ll

(INSUR.I\.NCE) No. The rule i n Virgini a is t~1at i f the a pplicant makes true sta t. e.me tT:-s
and t he a gent puts down false ones and the applicant is i n no way to blame, no tice
to t he a gen t is notice to the pri n.::ipa l and the company who employs s uch a n a g<!nt
:i.s estopped t o rE:ly ,on its o•m agent's wrong . See 168 Va. a t P • 645; also 198 Va .
255 on p . 2l 21 of the Insurance Case s in these Notes.

6 .~~hn

•

W. r e h0.d fo r som8 tim e bee~1 rou C;lch:.g out D:w._; SmrJoth to "t e:J. ch
r' i r:J. o. l a s so n 11 fo r t ·-·-k i n g out J ohn ' s e; ir l fr i ond a nd J ohn co. rri cd a pi stol
for t h i s purp ) sc . Fi r.-:-t ll :.~ ~ · .T ohr:. cctu c;ht up ·lit h f;.~.w · ·· t --. l J ca l b.Jc r
pa rl or, an d wit ho ut wa r ni ng , f ire d o.. shot a t Dave . J ohn 's a im was no t
to o good, f or th e shot only cre9.s ed Da ve ' s he a d . Da ve dove "lt J ohn and
'J. s cuffl e ensued .
During t he scuff l e J ohn f ell to t h e flo or, hitting
h is hea d upon t he ba r r a iling . As a dire ct r osult of thi s blow t o hi s
h ead , J ohn di ed . At t h e time of his dea t h , John ha d i n e ff e ct a policy
of a c ci dent a l dG a t h i nsuran ce i n which t he insurance company ha d agre e d
t o pay t he n~me d bene fici a ry, J oh n 1 s mothe r, $5,000 , up on t he deat h of
J ohn , if the deat h wer e " eff e ct e d so l el y t hr ough cxt er n::tl, vi ol ent, and
a cci dent a l means . 11 The i nsuran ce c or.1p ~1 ny r efu sed t o pa y t ho benefici a ry,
on t he gr ound tha t J ohn t s de a t h ha d n ot been cau s ed by a ccid ent a l means
within t he moan i ng of the policy . The benefi cia r y now come s t o y ou f or
a dvic e .
How ought f OU t o adv is e her?
(I nsurance ) Th ere was no a c cident h er e , so t h ere ca n be n o colle cti on
on the po licy. Th e de cease d pr e c i pit a t e d a fi ght and de at h c oul d ha v e
b ee n r easo nably fo r se eabl e . There i s n o a ccide nt if deat h coul d r oa son~ bl y be ant i cipa t e d fr om t h o a ctivity.
See 202 Va . 758.

/
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7.vStrict, a resident of Norfolk, Vao 1 let his seventeen-year-old son, Loafer, use
the family automobile but on the condition that he was not to let anyone else drive
it. Loafer faithfully premised to honor this command, but toward the end of a gay
evening, he decided to let his friend, Sharpie, drive ·so that Loafer and his date
could ride in the back seat. While driving the automobile, Sharpie negligently
struck and injured Faultless, who thereafter sued Sharpie for damages for persor.al
injury.
Strict had a liability insurnace policy issue:! in Norfolk, Va., on his automobile
which provided insurance protection ·only when the driver hC?.d the permission or consent of the named insured to operate the automobile, and the company denied
liability under the policy and refused to defend the action against Sharpie. After
Faultless recovered a judgment against him, Sharpie sued the insurance Company for
the amount of the judgmentc Is the company liable?
(INSURANCE) The Co~pany is liable. V#38ol-38l(a) as amended in 1962 expressly provides that consent may be given by the owner or cu3todian. The son was a custodian
and gave his consent.
Note: Before the amendment the law was otherwise where the owner told the party to
whom he entrusted the car not to let anyone else drive.. It is arguable that the
above statute in so far as it relates to custodians is applicable only to a nonowned automobile(as l-Jhere X buys a stolen C;ar and takes out liability insuranee).
A recent federal cas~, 238 F .Suppa lhl(l965.) allowed a recovery with no mention of
the above statute although the case arose after the effecti'lre date of the 1962
amendm~nta

J~!ones,

a special agent of the Allright Life Insurance Co., solicited Strong to
take out a policy of life insurance in that company. Jones had no authority to do
anything except solicit applications and collect and remit to the Company the first
premium. Pursuant to the solicitation Strong signed an application for a policy of
$5 1 000. The material parts of the application were: 0 No statements or promises made
by the person soliciting this insurance shall be binding on the Company, and the
Company shall incur no liability on account of this application until a policy is
issued and delivered to the applicant during his lifetime, he then being in good
health and having then paid the first premium.n
Jones arranged for a medical examination of Strong and seeing him after the examination had been made said to him: nyou passed the medical all right. I have sent
your application ih to the Company. Now pay me the premium and you will be insured".
Strong then paid Jones the first premium. The medical report was not satisfactory
and the Company delayed several week in acting on the application while it was
making further investigation. Before the investigation was completed, Strong was
killed. The Company tendered the return of the premium and denied liability.
You are consulted as to the right of the beneficiary to recover. How ought you
to advise?
(INSURANCE) Beneficiary may not recover, the company's application being a proposal
and no acceptance except as the conditions of its statement were to be complied with 4
At least as to its liability on the contract, the company was under no duty to act
promptly, although some few cases throughout the nation have held that it might
constitute tort liability if hhe delay was negligent because unreasonable, and the
applicant was misled. 198 va~670.
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9;r~~ Smith held a policy of public liability automobile insurance issued by
Imperial Insurance Company. The policy provided for coverage up to $15,000 for in•
juries caused any one person through the negligence of Smith in the operation of his
automobile& On Sept. 14, 1966, Smith carelessly drove through a red light and
struck John Rolfe, a young business man who was properly walking across the intersection. As a result of the accident, Rolfe was severely injured and permanently
crippled. Smith promptly gave proper notice of the accident to Imperial Insurance
Company and asked that they defend any claim made against him, as provided for
by the policy. In February of 1967, Rolfe brought an action against Smith in the
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond seeking damages of $75,000. After the
action was brought, Smith called upon Rolfe and persuaded him to compromise the
action by accepting $6,000, in full settlement. Smith at once notified the Insurance
Company of Rolfe's willingness to settle at that figure and recommended that the
Company make the necessary payment. The Insurance Company, which under the terms of
the policy, had the sole right to determine the compromise of claims, advised Smith
that they thought the settlement figure was too high and rejected it, and said they
would let the litigation continue and defend the case on behalf of Smith. The case
was tried without error on May 15, 1967, and the jury returned a verdict against
Smith and for Rolfe awarding the latter damages ~f $54,000. On May 22nd, Imperial
734.
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Insurance Company paid Rolfe $15 1 000, Smith paid him the remaining $39,000 1 and the
judgment was marked nsatisfied". Smith has now brought an action against Imperial
Insurance Company to recover damages for $39,000, and his motion for judgment has
alleged all the foregoing facts, and has charged that the Company did not act in
good faith when it refused to compromise the case for only ~6,000. Imperial Insurance
Company has demurred to the motion for judgment. Should the demurrer be sustained?
(INSURANCE) No. The motion for judgment alleged all the facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and therefore the demurrer will not li~~. The Supreme Court
of Appeals, in 206 Va.749(1966), recognized that where an insured is sued on a
liability insurance policy by an injured party and an offer to compromise the claim
within the limits of the coverage of the policy is rejected by the insurer, who is
defending the insured, and a verdict is returned well in excess of the policy
coverage against the insured, the insured has a cause of action against the insurer
for the excess amount which he must satisfy, if the insurer acted in what amounts to
bad faith in rejecting the offer of compromise. The Court stated the "the obligatior.
a ssumed by the insurer with respect to settlement is to exercise good f~~ in
dealing with offers of compromise, having both its own and the insured's interests
in mind. Thus stated, the Court adopted the Bad Faith Rule in relation to the
liability of the insurer t~ his insured. Smith, in his motion for judgment, stated
all the facts and then alleged that the insurer did not act in good faith in rejecting the offer of compromise. Thus, Smith has stated a cause of action and the
demurrer should be overruled.
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a.D~awkeyo

purchased and carried a life insurance policy issued by Southern Life
Insurance Co. The policy provided for the payment to HawkeyeJs sister as beneficiary, an amount indicated in a schedule of sliding payments ranging upward from
five hundred dollars for death of the insgred at age of twenty-one to five thousand
dollars for death at fifty years of age, thereafter gradually decreasing in amount
for added age. The policy contained this languages
"In each case the amount of benefits is to be determined by the attained
age at the time of death. 11
The policy contained this further provision:
"Should the insured die or death be caused directly or indirectly from
heart disease, liver, bladder or kidney trouble, contracted within three
years from the date of this policy, the company will pay one-fifth of
the amount otherwise payable under the terms of this policy."
The insured died from heart disease which had its inception during the third year
from the date the policy was issued. The beneficiary made claim for three thousand
dollars, the amount named in the policy at the attained age of the insured at the
time of his death. The company refused payment in that amount, and offered to pay
the sum of six hundred dollars, being one-fifth of the amount otherwise payable ~
The beneficiary refused to accept that amount and sued the company to recover three
thousand dollars, contending that the company could not contest its obligation to
pay according to the schedule contained in the policyo In support of this contention the beneficiary relied upon the provision of the Virginia statute which provides that a policy of life insurance shall be incontestable "for any cause after
it shall have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for two years from
its date .. "
·Is the contention of the beneficiary sound, and may she recover the sum of
three thousand dollars?
(INSURANCE) The beneficiary may not . recover the sum of three thousand dollars. The
incontestable statute applies when the validity of an insurance policy is contested;
it does not apply to the contract provisions of the policy which exclude certain
risks. Here the contest relate:a. to the: coverage of the policy, and not to its
validity, and henc e the incontestable statute has no application. 170 Va?479,

36.1-441.
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7.~lmer Vance purchased a life insurance policy from the Beneficial Life Insurance
Company, naming as the beneficiary therein his daughter, Sally Vanc e . He also
purchased a fire insurance policy on his home from the Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company. Sally Vance, for consideration, assigned her interest in the life insurance
policy to Happy Creek, who was in no way related to Sally and her father. Also,
Homer Vance for consideration, assigned his fire insurance policy to Ralph Surry,
who had no lnterest in the property. Both assignments were made without the knowledge and consent of the insurance companies. Neither policy contained a provis~on
respecting assignability. A year after the assignment of the fire insuranc~ pol1cy,
and while Homer Vance was still living, his house was destroyed by fire. S1x days
after the house burned Homer Vance died.
.
(a) Ralph Surry consults you and inquires whether he may enforce collectJ.on
of the fire insurance from Fire and Casualty Insurance Company.
(8) Happy Creek consults you and inquires whether he may enforce payment
of t~~)life insurance policy assi gned to him.
What would you ~dvise?
(INSURANCE) Surry may not enforce collection of the fire insurance, s1nce he had
no interest in the house at the time of loss. Furthermore, the general rule as to
fire insuranc e policies is that since they are regarded as personal contracts depending upon the confidence reposed by the insurers in the ~wners of property, they
are not assignable before loss without the cons ent of the 1nsurer. 29 Am Jur
1/652'
pp. 929'
930.may enforce payment of the life insurance pol1cy.
.
(b) Happy
Creek
~n the absence of
contrary provision in the policy, an assignment may be made of a l1fe insurance
policy without regard to whether the assignee has an insurable interest in the life
insured or not, and the assignee may recov8r upon it whatever the insured might
have recovered but for such assignment. 38.1-442.
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